Montenegro Struggles with Democratic Oversight of State Surveillance

In October 2021, former ANB director Dejan Peruncic was arrested on suspicion of illegally wiretapping the Special State Prosecutor’s Office, after a senior prosecutor announced that a surveillance device had been found in his office.

Peruncic’s trial is ongoing before the Higher Court in Podgorica, and Komnenic is among several high-profile figures identified in the indictment. 

Due to the sensitivity of the case, the trial is being conducted behind closed doors, but it is public knowledge that the witness list includes journalists, activists, religious leaders and former prosecutors – placed under surveillance, prosecutors argue, on Peruncic’s orders.

Critics, however, say it is hard to believe that Peruncic acted alone, without the direction of political figures above him.

In failing to address who issued the original orders, they say, the case risks falling short of full accountability.

“The prosecutorial construction essentially ends with the agency chief,” Komnenic, 50, told BIRN. “For me, the process feels more like documenting what was already known than addressing full responsibility.”

As surveillance technology develops at pace, privacy rights experts say legal safeguards in Montenegro are still being applied only selectively. Oversight remains weak, threatening public trust in the institutions tasked with protecting the state and its people.

By law, the ANB and police first need a request from a prosecutor and then a court order to conduct surveillance on someone, providing what human rights and privacy expert Damir Suljevic said were “multiple layers of control”.

“Yet in practice,” he said, “the role of oversight bodies is often limited by political loyalty and weak institutional independence”.

New spy chief has no security experience

For years, privately-owned TV Vijesti was a thorn in the side of the DPS and its leader, Milo Djukanovic. Komnenic presented a political interview show that regularly took aim at the way the DPS ran Montenegro as a fief.

Even before the DPS fell, Komnenic had been tipped off by intelligence sources that his activities were being tracked.

“I chose not to dwell on it,” he said. “I operated within the law, so I had no reason to worry.”

Commenting on what he later found out from prosecutors, Komnenic said he found the intelligence agency’s methods “amateurish”. 

“They didn’t even know who my wife was,” he said. “I don’t want to minimise the risks others faced, but to me it looked unprofessional.”

As Montenegro continues on the path to European Union accession, the rule of law and democratic oversight of security bodies will be key. Experts say the issue is one of how to balance security needs with the rights of the public.

In 2018, a court ruling prompted a tightening of rules on surveillance to require court approval; the law also provides for a special government-appointed controller to monitor the legality of ANB activities, and for parliament’s Security and Defence Committee to exercise oversight.

But it doesn’t always work like that, said Suljevic.

“In reality, the effectiveness of these mechanisms depends entirely on the professionalism of those who apply them,” he said. “And on political will, which is often lacking.”

The DPS fall from power ushered in a period of political instability in Montenegro. The pace of reform has been slow, and security sector policy remains a source of controversy.

Suljevic cited the appointment of Ivica Janovic as ANB director late last year, despite having no experience in intelligence or policing. 

According to media reports, Janovic previously worked for the Italian shipping line Mediterranean Shipping Company and in tourism; his half-brother is an MP of the ruling Europe Now party and his wife is head of the management board of the state company Morsko Dobro, which manages Montenegro’s maritime zone, including beaches, ports and coastal infrastructure.

Nevertheless, the Agency for the Prevention of Corruption said it saw no potential conflict of interest that might prevent his appointment.

The case “illustrates the problem of political and personal ties prevailing over professionalism”, said Suljevic. 

“It has become impossible to talk about the ANB in isolation. Its condition reflects the government’s overall approach to the security sector. Expectations of transparency and accountability are declining, as recent appointments show.” 

Questions of proportionality

Last year, citing official data, Vijesti reported that a total of 775 ‘special investigative actions’ were conducted in Montenegro in 2022-2023, involving wiretapping and covert photography.

As a result, however, indictments were filed against just 34 individuals, raising questions about proportionality and oversight.

“Special investigative measures must be used only when no other method can achieve the objective and with full respect for proportionality,” said criminologist Velimir Rakocevic. “In practice, the reasons for ordering surveillance are sometimes insufficiently specified, yet courts still approve them.”

Authorities have also introduced surveillance cameras in public spaces in the capital Podgorica and the coastal towns of Bar and Budva. 

The equipment, supplied by Israeli company AnyVision [since renamed Oosto], includes facial recognition software, though the police say they do not use this feature and the cameras are only there for traffic safety.

Nevertheless, civil society groups say the potential for misuse is high. Suljevic said it is not only the police operating security cameras in public places in Montenegro.

“There have been cases, like in Kotor, where significant parts of the city were under illegal video surveillance, reportedly installed by criminal clans,” he said. “Even after the cameras were removed, no one was held accountable.”

He warned that introducing facial recognition software without reforming the security sector would pose “a serious risk to privacy and democracy”.

In 2017, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that Montenegro’s installation of cameras in university lecture halls without university consent violated the right to privacy.

Suljevic said it is not only domestic political actors who have an interest in abusing surveillance technology in Montenegro, which is a member of NATO but is also subject to significant influence from neighbouring Serbia via pro-Serbian political figures currently sharing power.

“It is an open question whether surveillance systems could serve not only internal political control but also the interests of foreign actors, such as Russia or Serbia, or criminal clans,” he said. 

The public, he added, remains insufficiently aware of its rights when it comes to privacy.

“Violations of privacy often go unrecognised and unreported,” he said. “Real protection requires not only legal frameworks but also public education and stronger institutional capacity.”

The EU Delegation in Podgorica said it was “closely” monitoring legislative and institutional developments in Montenegro’s intelligence sector.

“Measures must be lawful and justified by concrete needs, ensuring respect for fundamental rights,” the delegation told BIRN in a written response.

Komnenic, the journalist, expressed scepticism about the readiness of the parties now in power to break with the practices of the DPS.

“When we talk about security,” he said, “we are living in total anarchy, which they exploit in ways we can only guess at.”